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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The State of Idaho appeals from the district court's order setting aside the 
restitution order. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On July 23, 2013, Andrew Keys' wife reported to law enforcement that, over the 
course of three years, Mr. Keys had hit her several times. (Presentence Investigation 
(PSI), p.3.) Mr. Keys told officers that Mrs. Keys initiated most of their physical 
altercations, but admitted that he had caused some physical injuries to Mrs. Keys. (PSI, 
p.4.) Mr. Keys was charged by Information with two counts of felony domestic battery, 
one count of misdemeanor domestic battery, and one count of felony domestic battery 
in the presence of a child. (R., pp.24-27.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement binding on all parties and the district court 
pursuant to I.C.R. 11 (f)(1 )(C), Mr. Keys pied guilty to one count of felony domestic 
battery and the remaining counts were dismissed. (9/27/13 Tr., p.5, L.22 - p.6, L.1 O; 
R., pp.28-38.) As part of the plea agreement, the parties agreed that Mr. Keys' 
judgment would be withheld and he would be on probation for three years. (9/27 /13 Tr., 
p.1, L.15- p.3, L.7; 11/22/13 Tr., p.3, L.10-p.4, L.10; R .. pp.30, 35.) Notably, the plea 
agreement did not mention restitution (R., pp.28-38.) At sentencing, the district court 
followed the plea agreement and sentenced Mr. Keys to a withheld judgment. ( 11 /22/13 
1 
, p.8, L23 - p.11, L.13; R., pp.57-60.) Restitution was not discussed during the 
hearing. 1 (See generally, 11/22/13 Tr.) 
Six months after the judgment conviction was entered, State filed an 
affidavit for restitution which attached a receipt from the Crime Victims Compensation 
Fund (hereinafter, CVCF) requesting restitution in the amount of $1,008.00 for 
counseling provided to Mrs. Keys. (R., pp.64-67.) 
Thereafter, the district court ordered restitution.2 (R., pp.68-70.) Five months 
later, Mr. Keys moved the district court to set aside the restitution order. (R., pp.71-72.) 
Mr. Keys asserted that the district court did not have jurisdiction to order restitution as 
restitution was not contemplated by the parties to the binding I.C.R. 11 (f)(1 )(C) plea 
agreement, and the State was not following the terms of the plea agreement when it 
filed the affidavit and proposed order. (R.. pp.71-72.) The State objected to Mr. Keys' 
motion to set aside restitution, and asserted that because Mr. Keys failed to timely 
object to the order of restitution, the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain 
Mr. Keys' motion to set aside restitution order. (R., pp.73-74.) In its accompanying 
memorandum, the State argued that even where the plea bargain is silent on the issue 
of restitution, it does not preclude the victim's ability to claim restitution. (R., pp.73-86.) 
After hearing the arguments of counsel at the hearing on Mr. Keys' motion to set aside 
the restitution order, the district court relied on State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758 (2010), 
1 After pronouncing Mr. Keys' sentence, the district court specifically asked the 
prosecutor, "is there anything else that you want the court to consider." (11/22/13 
Tr., p.11, Ls.13-14.) The prosecutor responded no, and reminded the court of the no 
contact provision. (11/22/13Tr., p.11, Ls.15-16.) 
2 The assigned district court judge had changed between the entry of the order of 
probation filed on November 26, 2013, and the order of restitution, filed May 14, 2014. 
(R., pp.57-70.) 
2 
to hold that the statute governing restitution orders expressly confers jurisdiction on a 
to order restitution beyond the date of finality the judgment of 
; the court denied the motion 
Tr., p.11, L.14-p.12, L.12; R., pp.89-91.) 
set aside restitution (11/26/14 
Mr. Keys then filed a motion to reconsider and a notice of appeal timely from the 
order denying the motion to set aside the restitution order. (R., pp.92-97.) In his motion 
to reconsider, Mr. Keys asked the district court to reconsider its decision because the 
court's order denying the motion was based on a term of probation and not a term of the 
withheld judgment, and because there was no finding by the district court that the delay 
in requesting restitution was reasonably necessary. (R., pp.92-93.) Mr. Keys also 
asserted that the district court did not have jurisdiction to enter the restitution order, and 
that the terms of the plea agreement were not followed when the State filed the affidavit 
and proposed order for restitution. (R., p.92.) The State objected, and argued that the 
Court of Appeals, in State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659 (Ct App. 2002) and State v. 
Weaver, 158 Idaho 167 (Ct. App. 2014), held that the district court has continuing 
jurisdiction over a case as it relates to restitution matters until the defendant is 
discharged from probation. (R., pp.98-100; 12/23/14 Tr., p.9, Ls.3-7.) 
The district court held a hearing on Mr. Keys' motion to reconsider. (See 
generally, 12/23/14 Tr.) After the hearing, the district court granted the motion and set 
aside the restitution order because it found restitution was not contemplated by the 
terms of the plea agreement or made a part of the sentence, and, alternatively, because 
there was no indication that the six month delay was necessary to compute the amount 
of restitution. (R., pp.102-105.) Thereafter, Mr. Keys withdrew his notice of appeal and 
3 
State filed a notice of appeal. (R., 107-114.) Mr. Keys' appeal was dismissed on 
20, 2015. , p. 1 
4 
ISSUE 
district erred in was improperly 
5 
ARGUMENT 
The State Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Finding Restitution Was 
Improperly Ordered 
Introduction 
The district court correctly found the restitution order was improperly granted 
where the district court did not find, and the State did not show, that it was necessary to 
award restitution at such a late date. The district court properly granted Mr. Keys' 
motion to reconsider and setting aside the restitution order. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "when reviewing a trial court's decision 
to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration, the reviewing court utilizes the same 
standard of review used by the lower court in deciding the motion for reconsideration. 
For a district court, the standard of review on a motion to reconsider is "the same 
standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being 
reconsidered." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276 (2012). That is, if the 
original order was a matter within the trial court's discretion, so too is the decision to 
grant or deny the motion for reconsideration Id. Finally, the district court must consider 
any new admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory 
order. Id. 
The decision whether to order restitution is discretionary. State v. Gonzales, 144 
Idaho 775, 777 (Ct. App. 2007). "It is generally recognized, however, that courts of 
criminal jurisdiction have no power or authority to direct reparations or restitution to a 
crime victim in the absence of a statutory provision to such effect." Id. Thus, a district 
6 
court's exercise of discretion in ordering restitution must be within the limitations set 
in I § 19-5304. Id. On appeal, factual findings of the district court will not be 
if they are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Straub, 1 Idaho 882, 
885 (2013). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept to support a conclusion Id. 
C. The District Court Correctly Found That Restitution Was Improperly Ordered 
The district court properly determined that, because there had been no mention 
of restitution at sentencing, and there was no finding that it was necessary to extend the 
time allowable for restitution claims past the date of the sentencing, its order of 
restitution was improper. On appeal, the State claims that the district court mistakenly 
believed it did not have jurisdiction to enter a restitution order (Respondent's Brief, p.7); 
however, this was not the conclusion of the district court in its order granting Mr. Keys' 
motion for reconsideration. In its order, the district court correctly noted that I.C. § 19-
5304(6) requires restitution orders to be entered by the district court at the time of 
sentencing. (R., p.103.) The district court further noted that a restitution order can be 
entered post-sentencing only if the district court determines the delay is "necessary to 
gather information so as to locate all victims and correctly compute the amount of 
restitution." (R., p.103.) The district court then correctly concluded that it did not have 
the statutory authority to order restitution because restitution was not ordered at 
sentencing and there had been no indication that the additional six months was 
necessary to compute the amount of restitution. (R., p.104.) 
Idaho Code Section 19-5304(6) establishes a time frame during which the district 
court may entertain a request for restitution State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758, 762 
7 
App. 2010). Idaho Code Section 19-5304(6) requires that restitution orders shall be 
time sentencing or such later date as deemed necessary by the 
" statutory provision thus allows the district court to delay entering a 
restitution order until the parties have had the opportunity to marshal their evidence and 
present their request for restitution or opposition thereto. See Jensen, 149 Idaho at 
762. The section also "contemplates that the court may need to grant the prosecution a 
reasonable amount of time necessary to gather information so as to locate all victims 
and correctly compute the amount of restitution." Jensen, 149 Idaho at 762 (quoting 
Ferguson, 138 Idaho at 662) (emphasis in original). 
In State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659 (Ct App. 2002), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
noted that the key word in this section of the restitution statute is "necessary," and 
vacated the trial court's restitution award because the State had failed to show it was 
"necessary" to put off the entry of the order of restitution, and the district court lacked 
authority to reopen the case after the defendant had been discharged from probation. 
Id. at 662. The Court held that, before the district court can order restitution post-
sentencing, the State must demonstrate that the delay was necessary and the district 
court must make a finding that such delay was necessary. Id.; State v. Jensen, 149 
Idaho 758, 763 (Ct App. 2010). Otherwise, the district court exceeds its authority under 
I.C. § 19-5304(6). Jensen, 149 Idaho at 763. 
In the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, the district court 
relied on the Idaho Court of Appeals' holdings in Ferguson and Jensen in holding that 
the district court exceeded its authority in awarding restitution where the State failed to 
demonstrate the delay was necessary. (R., pp.102-105.) The court was correct in 
8 
finding that there had been no indication that a six month delay was necessary where 
proffered no justification as to 
attesting to restitution for the 
over six months elapsed before it filed an 
Further, the district court did not make any 
findings as to why the State delayed seeking restitution for over six months. 
Specifically, the district court did not make any findings that it was "necessary" to put off 
the entry of the order of restitution for six months past the date of sentencing. 
Further, there is no indication that the restitution requested for Mrs. Keys' 
counseling was in any way caused by or related to Mr. Keys' crime. (R., pp.64-67.) 
The supporting documentation lacks dates as to when the counseling was provided and 
contains no indication whatsoever that the counseling was necessitated by Mr. Keys' 
illegal acts. 3 (R., pp. 64-67.) The evidence submitted in support of the motion included 
an affidavit from the prosecutor in which he concluded that the CVCF was owed 
$1,008.00, and a copy of a letter from the CVCF indicating that it was "requesting 
restitution for payments made on behalf of Gloria Keys." (R., pp.64-67.) 
Here, there was no restitution requested until six months after Mr. Keys was 
sentenced, the State offered no explanation as to why the six month delay was 
necessary, and the district court made no finding that extending the statutory period 
within which restitution may be ordered six months past the sentencing date was 
"necessary". Thus, the district court correctly concluded that its Order of Restitution 
was entered erroneously. 
3 Idaho case law is clear that the restitution statute does not authorize an award of 
restitution for future counseling. State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 629 (Ct. App. 2001) 
(holding that the CVCF was not experiencing any present or existent suffering due to 
the payment of expense of victims because no money had yet been paid out at the time 
of request for restitution). Restitution for victim counseling that was not caused by the 
defendant's crime is impermissible. State v. Wardle, 137 Idaho 808 (2002). 
9 
CONCLUSION 
Keys respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision of the 
DATED this 27th day of October, 2015. 
SALL J. COOLEY 
Deputy State App ate Public Defender 
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